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the tentative character of these papers. 
This paper discusses the growth and development of the international 
capital market during the past decade• considers whether it can be said 
that a genuine international capital market now exists, and discusses the 
advantages and disadvantages of one integrated capital market transcending 
national economies. "Capital markets" involve the lllObiliz.ation of savings 
by those who want or aTe willing to accept financial claims, for invest­
ment (or consumption) by o1hem who are willing to accept financial liabili­
ties or share their equity. Capital markets are usually distinguished from 
"money markets" by the maturity of the claims that are traded there, the 
capital market referring to transactions in claims with maturities in ex­
cess (definitionally) of one year, and usually in excess of five years, al­
though any clear distinction between the two .must be arbitrary, for 
these markets may be, and typically are, closely related. Nedium-term 
bank lending, for example, involves maturities in excess of one year but 
o-.dinarily does not give rise to marketable securities. 
seve.ul _ge.os~&Ph.ica.lly--dis-ti.a.ct----capita.l-.-.markets. ..can be a.aid to be 
integrated -- that is, effectively one market -- to the extent that a 
significant number of savers do not distinguish among claims on the basis 
of the geographical location of the borrower. In the international con.text, 
this means that a significant number of savers do hot distinguish among 
borrowers on the basis of nationality. This failure to distinguish must in~ 
elude, of course, both the willingness to accept claims on foreigners and 
the ability to do so, the latter implying an absence of balance-of-payment~ 
and other restrictions against foreign investment. 
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The extent to which there can be said to be an Atlantic capital market. 
encompassing Canada, the United States, and many or most of the countries 
of western Europe, can be approached empirically from two angles. We can 
ask about the absolute and relative volume of long-term financial trans­
actions crossing national boundaries and about the nationality and other 
characteristics of the borrowers and lenders. Or we can apply the economi­
cally more meaningful test of the extent to which bond yields and share 
prices have been brought into harmony. One market implies one price for 
identical goods or claims, and similar prices for similar goods or claims. 
A genuine Atlantic capital market would therefore imply similar interest 
rates or yields for financial claims of similar risk and liquidity. The 
next two sections of this paper offer some sketchy evidence on both of these 
approaches. Following this evidence, I will draw some implications for 
economic policy of the tendency toward one market, and offer an assessment 
of the advantages and disadva~tages at the prce2.n~ time of a unified capital 
market spanning national boundaries. 
1. The Size and Growth of International Capital Mc,,,ements 
The rapid growth in foreign bond flotations during the decade of the 
sixties has been a source of universal astonishment. From barely more than 
$200 million in 1958 (close to $400 million if the United Kingdom is in­
cluded), foreign bond issues in Europe grew to over $4.7 billion in 1968, 
a compound growth rate of nearly 30 percent a year. The growth is far less 
dramatic, but still dramatic, if the United States market is included: total 
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foreign bond issues on both sides of the Atlantic rose from $1.5 billion in 
1958 to $6.3 billion in 19681 , a fourfold increase (Table 1). A distinction 
may be drawn between foreign bonds issued in national markets, denominated'in 
the national currency of the market in which it is floated, and "international" 
bond issues, which are denominated in a currency (usually U.S. dollars but also 
German marks, two or more currencies, and units of account) different from 
that of the country(ies) in which it is floated. 2 
The overwhelming bulk of the long-term foreign borrowing in the United 
States is by Canadians, although Japan, Israel, the World Bank, and (before 
the imposition of the interest equalization tax in 1963) several European countries 
have also been important borrowers. U.S. corporations and their subsidiaries 
have been the single most important group of borrowers in European markets, 
accounting for nearly half of all new issues (many of them convertible bonds) 
in 1968. Non-American corporations accounted for nearly a quarter of the 
borrowing, and governmental bodies and international institutions for the 
remainder. Characterizing the lenders is more difficult, since it is not 
known who ultimately purchases these bonds. In the United States, insurance 
companies and pension funds provide a steady source of demand for new bond 
issues. In the European market, individuals and family trusts are relatively 
1. It might be noted in passing that recent levels compare favorably 
in absolute magnitude to the average annual $2.0 billion in foreign bonds 
issued in Europe and the United States during 1924-28, the alleged heyday 
of the international capital market. 
2. Foreign bonds denominated in German marks are considered "inter­
national" bonds after March 1964, even when floated on the German market, 
since they were exempt from the coupon tax levied on interest payments to 
foreign holders of German bonds and hence had lower yields than German 
bonds floated on the domestic market. 
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Table 1 
Foreign Bond Issuesa, 1958-1968 
($ million) 
Foreign Issues on Domestic Markets International Total 
United States Europeanb Issuesb 
1958 1138 302 82 1522 
1959 802 337 31 1170 
1960 636 393 29 1058 
1961 558 559 79 1196 
1962 1185 430 1615 
1963 1414 426 119 1958 
1964 1191 263 838 2293 
1965 1532 264c 1192 2989 
1966 1317 550c 1155 3021 
1967 1619d 404c 2002 4025 
196.8 1576d 1185c 3517 6278 
a Including private placements and convertible bonds 
b Foreign bonds issued in Germany after imposition of the 25 percent_ 
coupon tax on German bonds in March 1964 are treated as international 
issues, since they are exempt from the tax. 
c Including the Canadian market 
d E~cludes portion purchased by foreigners 
Sources: 1958-1966: OECD, Capital Markets Study, Vol. III, Functioning of 
Capital Markets,(Paris, OECD, 1968), p. 717; 1967-1968: Department 
of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, and Morgan Guaranty Trust 
Company, World Financial Markets. 
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more important (leading to correspondingly higher selling costs for the 
"retail" market).' It has been estimated for the mid-sixties that about half 
the purchas_es of foreign bonds issued in Europe were by banks and trusts in 
Switzerland, acting on behalf of customers from all over the world; another 
120 percent of the funds came from other continental European countries. 
Over three-quarters of the international bond issues, narrowly defined, 
were denominated in U.S. dollars, and therefore over two-thirds of total 
outside the United States 
foreign bond issues/were so denominated. Like a language, a currency is 
useful in proportion to the number of people who use it. By using a connnon 
currency, the market is widened and the potential liquidity of financial 
claims is increased -- potential since this liquidity depends on the de­
velopment of secondary markets where securities are bought and sold after 
issue and before maturity. (Secondary markets in Europe have developed more 
slowly than the new issues market.)During 1968 and 1969 use of the German 
mark became more prominent, as the German monetary authorities deliberately 
reduced interest rates and took other steps to encourage the export of 
capital, making DM-denominated bonds less costly to borrowers than dollar-
2denominated ones. 
Foreign and international bond issues have grown rapidly relative to 
the total activity on the various national capital markets, as well as in 
absolute volume. Comparable measures are difficult to achieve, but on the 
1. David Williams, "Foreign Currency Issues in European Security 
Markets," IMF Staff Papers, May 1967, p. 61. 
2. Expectations of a future revaluation of the mark also helped 
lower coupon rates on DM-denominated bonds. 
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basis of total net new bond issues on the eight major European capital markets 
plus the United States, as computed by the OECD, the share of foreign and 
eleveninternational bond issues rose from five percent in 1960 to , percent 
in 1965 and to an estimated fourteen percent in 1968. 1 
Equity shares comprise another part of the capital market. Here one 
must turn to the secondary market for relevant information, since it is far 
more important, relative to new issues, than is the case for bonds. Until 
1967 and 1968, net movements of funds between countries on account of pur­
chases of stocks (excluding direct investment, aimed at management control) 
was rather small, Americans added very little to their holdings 
of foreign stocks during the sixties, while the British engaged in large­
scale net liquidation of their foreign share holdings. Net foreign purchases 
of American stocks rose sharply after the mid-sixties, however~ from $220 
million in 1963 to nearly $2.3 billion in 1968, with purchases from Europe 
and Canada accounting for the bulk of them. Mutual funds spread rapidly in 
the late sixties, especially in Germany and Italy, and many•of these specialized 
in the purchase of foreign -- mainly American -- stocks. 
From the viewpoint of the integration of capital markets, however, it 
is gross rather than net transactions that count. These have been substantial, 
even when net transactions were small. In 1968, for instance, foreigners 
bought $t3.l billion in American stocks, and sold$10.8 billion, over six 
times the levels of 1960; American purchases of foreign stocks (except for 
1. OECD, Capital Markets Study, op. cit., Statistical Annex, 
pp. 122-23, and the sources there citecf:" 
-7-
dealers, generally subject to the interest equalization tax of 15 percent) 
amounted to $1.,6 billion in 1968, while sales came to $1.2 billion, both 
over double the levels of 1960. These sums are of course small relative 
to the total gross value of stock sales ($125 billion on the New York Stock 
Exchange alone in 1968). But here, as elsewhere in economics, it is the 
marginal buyer that counts. The question, therefore, is whether international 
transactions in stocks and bonds were sufficiently large at the margin to 
influence or even to govern prices in the various national markets. 
Before turning to an examination of the evidence on that point, two 
other important dimensions of international capital movements should be 
mentioned, for while they are not strictly part of "capital markets" as 
defined here, both short-term capital movements and direct investments pro­
vide potential indirect linkages between capital markets to the extent that 
there is some substitutability between short- and long-term financial claims, 
on the one hand, and between long-term financial claims and real assets on 
the other. Capital markets could be fully integrated in the economically 
meaningful sense of price equalization for claims of similar quality even 
with no movement of long-term portfolio capital between countries, for in­
stance, provided that money and capital markets were tightly linked within 
each country and that national money markets were closely linked internationally. 
National money markets are linked these days primarily through Euro­
dollars, a market in short-term dollar claims located in London and other 
European financial centers. Where national exchange regulations permit the 
outward movement of short-term funds, those with such funds to invest will 
compare their earning opportunities at home with those in Eurodollar deposits, 
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and will shift funds accordingly. Even where regulations limit the outward 
movement of funds, credit-worthy borrowers will draw funds from the 
Euro-dollar market when rates there are more attractive than in their home 
markets. In this way national money markets tend to be tied together. 
The Eurodollar market has grown to substantial proportions. At an esti­
mated $25 billion of total liabilities by the end of 1968, excluding inter­
bank deposits, the Eurodollar market was roughly equivalent in size to the 
total money supply in Italy, Japan, or the United Kingdom, and was sub­
stantially exceeded only by the money supplies in France and the United 
States. It has shown surprising responsiveness, moreover, to new demands 
placed on it. Switches of borrowers or lenders between the Eurodollar market 
and domestic markets can therefore exert a powerful influence on domestic 
monetary conditions, and for many countries could in principle largely under­
cut monetary policy as an instrument of economic stabilization. This extreme 
has not yet been reached, in part because a switch between dollars and local 
oncurrencies requires either that the switching party take an exchange risk 
that he insure against it, e.g. by selling forward the currency he hasor 
purchased. The presence of exchange risk serves to insulate national money 
markets from one another even when all the technical facilities for one in­
tegrated market are present. 
Direct investment abroad can also provide a link between capital markets. 
Recent work on the motivation for direct investment has rightly 
emphasized the exploitation of quasi-monopoly powers arising from patents 
or other unique technological or managerial advantages. Many direct investors 
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borrow in local markets, both to establish credit lines and to hedge against 
exchange risks, and this practice suggests that direct investment is not 
primarily in response to national differences in long-term bond yields. 
Nevertheless, direct investment does usually involve the transfer of funds 
from one country to another, and since the early sixties such transfers have 
taken place on a substantial scale. 
U.S. takeovers of European firms bid up the price of existing assets, 
and takeovers for cash shift funds from the U.S. capital market to the 
capital or money markets of Europe. Investments in new plant and equipment 
are more ambiguous in their effects, since any flow of funds from the parent 
company is accompanied by an increased demand for funds that may more than 
offset it, depending on the extent of local borrowing and the size of multi­
plier effects. But many international corporations, with access to two or 
more national capital markets, are influenced in their source of funds by 
relative costs, and hence tend to bring borrowing conditions in national 
markets into closer harmony. Direct investment also plays a role in bring-
ing national money markets together, as corporations with temporarily idle 
funds place them where the yield-risk combination is most attractive, or 
fill short-term cash needs by borrowing in the money market where costs are 
lowest. Indeed, international corporations have been among the major partici­
pants both in the Eurodollar market and in the Eurobond market. 
In passing, it is of interest that both the Eurodollar market and the 
international bond market were encouraged by the imposition of national con­
trols that inhibited the most advantageously situated national market from 
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serving an international role. In 1957 the British commercial banks were 
circumscribed in their ability to lend sterling outside the United Kingdom, but 
were left free to carry on in other currencies, so began to accept deposits 
and lend in dollars. In 1963 the interest equalization tax effectively closed 
the New York bond market to a large class of foreign borrowers and thereby 
generated a demand for issues in Europe, a demand that was greatly augmented 
two years later by the voluntary limitations placed on U.S. financing of 
direct investment abroad. 
2. Interest rates and asset prices 
The flow of funds across national boundaries unquestionably increased 
sharply during the sixties, both absolutely and relative to internal fi-
nancial transactions. ldentifiable international money and capital markets 
thesi developments
appeared. But were ~ sufficient to integrate the national financial markets 
in the sense of bringing together prices of similar financial assets? A 
perfect market requires a single price for the same commodity prevailing 
each point in
everywhere at / time. When this condition is not met, markets are to that 
extent fragmented. 
It is difficult to test empirically the extent to which we have achieved 
integrated money and capital markets among the major industrial countries, 
since assets in different countries continue to be different in one important 
respect: they are denominated in different currencies. The possibility of 
changes in exchange rates among the currencies introduces an element of risk 
which, from the viewpoint of a resident of any particular country, is not 
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present when all assets are denominated in a single currency. The assets also 
differ in other, less important respects. A comparison of interest rates on 
high quality short-term assets and on long-term government bonds nonetheless 
reveals a marked tendency toward convergence following the move to currency 
convertibility by the major European countries in late 1958. Table 2 shows 
that the dispersion around the mean of short-term interest rates for eight 
countries declined substantially after 1958. The decline in dispersion 
marked 
was less/ for long-term bond rates,and except for 1966 the dispersion 
steadily 
declined/ relative to the mean bond Yield, suggesting some convergence in 
the long-term Cap.ital market as well. The sharp increase in bond rate dis­
persion in 1966 is attributable &olely to a 2 percentage point increase in 
German bond rates, to 8.4 percent, in. a period in which the German state and 
local authorities -were borrowing at an exceptionally heavy rate and the 
Bundesbank tightened credit to dampen total spending. The increase in absolute 
and relative dispersion of short-term rates in 1968 is attributable to a com­
bination of high rates in Britain and France, reflecting doubts about the ex­
change rates of their respective currencies, combined with an exceptionally 
low rate in Germany designed both to stimulate capital outflow and to promote 
domestic capital spending in the aftermath of the recession generated by ex­
cessively tight monetary conditions in 1966. 
In addition to coming closer together over time, interest rates showed 
a greater tendency to move together th~ough time from 1962 to 1967 than 
before, indicating a greater influence of one market on another (Chart 1). 
This tendency was reversed in late 1967 and 1968, when a series of exchange crises 
disturbed interest rate relationships and induced several countries to impose 
tight controls on capital movements. 
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Table 2 
International Convergence of 
aInterest Rates, 1958 - 1968 
CShort-termb Government Bonds 
Mean Standard Coefficient of Mean Standard Coefficient 
Deviation Variationd Deviation of Variationd 
1958 2.86 1.22 .43 4.48 .94 .21 
1960 3.37 1.21 .36 4.66 .93 .20 
1962 2.96 .95 .32 4.80 •89 .19 
1964 3.66 .74 .20 5.36 .93 .17 
1966 4.80 .83 .17 5.89 1.13 .19 
1968 4.74 1.75 .37 5.97 .81 .14 
a Average rate for June of indicated year 
b Unweighted mean and standard deviation of 3-month Treasury bill 
or call money rates for Belgium, Canada, France, Germany (F.R.), 
Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States 
c With maturity in excess of 12 years, for countries listed in 
preceding footnote plus Italy and Sweden 
d Standard deviation divided by mean 
Source: Underlying data from International Financial Statistics 
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Equity prices are more difficult to compare, for European firms= publish 
too little financial information to compute price-earnings ratios and other 
measures of performance from the perspective of the share-holder. This fact not 
only makes analysis difficult, but it also inhibits the effective integration 
of the markets for equities. Indices of share prices do show some sympathetic 
movement from country to country, but the movement is not very close and may in 
any case reflect broadly sympathetic movements in national economic conditions 
more than direct buying and selling links between equity markets. Divergences 
in share price movements reflect differences in national economic developments, 
such as the German recession in 1966-67, and expected or actual changes 
in exchange rates. For an industrial economy dependent on trade, over-
valuation will weaken profit performance in manufacturing, while devaluation 
will improve it. 
3. The Challenge of and Response to Financial Integration 
All this evidence points to the conclusion that there has been some inte­
gration of money and capital markets during the past decade, but that there is 
still a substantial way to go before we can speak of unified markets. Even the 
integration that has taken place so far, however, has important implications 
for the economies involved. The integration of financial markets limits the 
scope for the autonomous pursuit of national policy. This is most obviously the 
case for monetary policy, but it is also true for taxation and regulation of 
business and for exchange rate policy. 
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Consider monetary policy first. In a world of high capital mobility, a 
tightening of monetary conditions, e.g. through open market sales by the central 
bank or through higher bank reserve requirements, will serve less to dampen 
domestic spending than to attract an inflow of funds from abroad. Similarly, 
an attempt to ease domestic monetary conditions to stimulate spending will in­
stead simply stimulate an outflow of funds. Financial integration thus poses a 
profound threat to the traditional reliance on monetary policy for stabiliza­
tion of the domestic economy. The effectiveness of monetary policy for this 
purpose is greatly reduced by high capital mobility across national boundaries, 
for the rest of the world in effect becomes a residual source of demand for 
excess domestic liquidity and a residual source of supply of funds. 
By the same to.ken, however, monetary policy becomes very effective as an 
instrument for influencing a country's short-run international payments position. 
A slight tightening of domestic credit will attract funds from abroad and 
thus may be used to finance a payments deficit. Monetary policy used for this 
purpose will be more effective in the short-run than it will in the long, 
partly because some of the initial inflow of funds in response to tighter mone­
tary conditions will represent stock adjustment of a once-for-all character, 
partly because, in the absence of perfect capital mobility, higher interest 
charges on outstanding short-term indebtedness must be set against whatever 
continuing inflows there are, 
An additional implication of increased capital mobility is that fiscal 
policy will become more effective at influencing domestic demand. The monetarist 
claim that the impact on aggregate demand of "pure" fiscal action -- changes in 
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the government budget position with no accommodating change in the money supply 
will be largely if not wholly offset by interest-induced changes if investment 
demand ceases to be relevant in a world in which the required change in the 
money supply is provided by capital movements to or from the rest of the world. 
In the limiting case of perfect capital mobility, the money supply for all but 
the largest countries will accommodate any change in aggregate demand at un­
changed interest rates without intervention by the monetary authorities. Thus 
while the effectiveness of monetary policy in stabilizing the economy will de­
cline with increased capital mobility, hence generating a need for alternative 
stabilization measures, the effectiveness of fiscal policy at influencing aggre­
gate demand will increase. 
The weakening of monetary policy for stabilization purposes nevertheless 
poses a serious problem for governments, since .it is usually the most flexible 
instrument of policy at hand and for institutional reasons it is also more 
insulated from short-run political considerations. Not surprisingly, governments 
are loathe to give up their reliance on monetary policy -- indeed, it is not 
clear either that they should or that they can, politically speaking -- and they 
have therefore taken a number of steps to counteract the integrating tendencies 
evident in money and capital markets. These actions in turn make more difficult 
analysis of the degree to which money and capital markets have become unified: 
the potential unification may be far greater than that actually observed, as 
summarized by the data in the preceding sections, because of deliberate counter­
veiling steps to reduce the integrating pressures in the interests of preserving 
some degree of national autonomy in the exercise of monetary policy. 
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Government response to the greater interdependence between national 
capital markets has been widespread. These responses have often been taken 
under the guise of balance-of-payments policies, but that is merely the other 
side of the coin. Special measures to restrain capital outflows serve to pro­
tect the balance of payments in periods in which for domestic reasons the 
monetary authorities desire to maintain a greater degree of monetary ease than 
prevails abroad. That these measures are not governed principally by balance­
of-payments considerations is indicated by the fact that countries in payments 
surplus have also taken steps to insulate their economies from high international 
capital mobility, even though balance-of-payments pressures were not so acute 
as for countries in deficit. 
The devices used are well known. Virtually all countries restrict foreign 
access to their domestic capital markets, usually on the grounds that unlimited 
access by foreigners could create undue disruption of imperfectly developed 
national capital markets. Britain and the United States, however, restrict 
access on balance-of-payments grounds, in the case of the United States through 
an "interest equalization tax" on U.S. purchases of European and certain other 
issues, which is to say that the authorities in those countries would not like 
tobe.obliged to maintain interest rates at the levels required to l~nit foreign 
borrowing. Both countries also limit purchases by their residents of out­
standing foreign securities. The interest equalization tax applies in the 
United States, and Britain in effect imposes a tax by requiring British resi­
dents wanting to invest abroad to buy foreign currency at a premium but to 
-18-
sell a portion of receipts from liquidation of foreign assets to the authori­
ties at the official exchange rate. These and other countries also limit the 
amount of short-term investment that can be undertaken abroad. 
High capital mobility can be as frustrating to countries wanting to tighten 
domestic monetary conditions as to those wanting to ease them. At various 
times France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland have all prohibited 
interest payments on deposits by foreigners, to inhibit an inflow of short-term 
funds. Special reserve requirements have been imposed on foreigners' deposits 
with the same aim. Since 1964 Germany has imposed special withholding taxes 
on interest paid to foreign holders of domestic bonds, a kind of negative 
interest equalization tax. (Foreign bonds floated in Germany are exempt from 
this tax, so they command lower nominal yields and therefore draw funds largely 
from outside Germany.) Both Germany and Italy, and to a lesser extent the 
Netherlands and Switzerland, have encouraged their banks to channel short-
term funds abroad through directives or att'ractive forward swap arrangements, 
thereby regaining some control over domestic monetary conditions. But this 
technique will work only so long as domestic non-bank borrowers do not have 
direct access to foreign sources of funds, a condition that has eroded over 
time. 
International transactions in equities do not escape the national re­
straints. The taxes imposed by Britain and the United States apply to equities 
as well as to bonds. Several countries limit purchases of foreign equities by 
their residents to those quoted on the national stock exchange, which in turn 
are restricted. In the late sixties the growth of mutual funds in Europe 
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provided a closer link between equity markets, especially in Germany and Italy, 
for they permitted residents to purchase balanced and diversified packages of 
foreign securities of which they had little direct knowledge. In 1969, however, 
the Italian government limited sharply the activities of these mutual funds, 
despite the fact that Italy was running a large payments surplus at the time, 
because they were drawing equity funds away from prospective domestic issuers 
at a time when the Italian authorities wanted to stimulate domestic investment. 
In sum, national authorities do not yet seem ready to accept the limita­
tions imposed on their own freedom to influence domestic financial conditions 
by an integrated capital market spanning national boundaries. 
High international mobility of capital also imposes limits nationalon 
autonomy in matters of taxation and business regulation, although these limi­
tations are both less obvious and far less evident than is true for monetary 
policy. There is little question 1 however, that one of the principal attrac­
tions of foreign bonds to investors is that income on them can be more easily 
concealed from the domestic tax authorities. Foreign bond issues registered 
on the London market, unlike domestic issues, are not subject to British with-
on domestic issues,
holding tax (where tax treaties eliminate British withholding/ they also pro-
vide for exchange of information between taxing authorities); but they are not 
generally subject to withholding tax by the United States or by any 
other country either .• · High international 
capital mobility under these circumstances will erode the ability of national 
authorities to tax interest income except in those countries where the tra­
dition of voluntary tax compliance is strong, for prospective bond-holders can 
readily invest in international bonds to escape taxation. 
-20-
High capital mobility also weakens national regulation of securities mar­
kets and corporate financial activity. In early 1969 a Swiss company subverted 
a Swiss requirement that existing stockholders be given preference on new stock 
issues, for example, by establishing a financial subsidiary in the Netherlands 
Antilles to raise desired funds through a convertible bond issue. This kind 
of escape from regulation through migration was a familiar phenomenon in the 
United States around the turn of the century~ where business regulation by the 
constituent states was gradually eroded as the railroad and the telegraph 
transformed local markets into a national one. Those states most aggressive 
in the competition for business location set a tone for lax business regulation, 
and as a result regulatory responsibilities were gradually taken over by the 
Federal government. 
Pressures for supra-national action in the field of business regulation 
and taxation have not yet reached an advanced stage, but the beginnings of 
such pressure can be seen both in the desire for increased inter-governmental 
consultation on such matters and in the attempts, largely so far by the United 
States, to tax 11foreign 11 income and to extend its national regulations beyond 
n'tionalboundaries. The Revenue Act of 1962 levied U.S. taxes on the income of 
U.S.-owned corporations operating from tax haven countries; and the Kennedy 
Administration had asked for a much broader extension of the U.S. tax than 
that finally passed by Congress. Similarly, in 1965 the Securities and Exchange 
Commission instructed a number of foreign (mostly Canadian) companies to sub-
mit information reports because their securities were being traded in the over-the­
counter market in the United States. The foreign companies regarded this as an 
-21-
unwarranted intrusion into their business affairs, and they were supported by 
their governemnts; but the SEC was merely carrying out its Congressional man-
possible
date to protect American investors from/exploitation by unscrupulous-corporate 
management. The problem of national jurisdiction arose because securities 
markets transcend national boundaries. 
A third area in which high international mobility of capital has important 
implications is exchange rate policy. A technically well-developed inter­
national money market, among other things,facilitates the movement of funds 
into or out of different currencies in anticipation of exchange rate changes, 
so the volume of currency speculation is greatly enlarged during periods of 
uncertainty about exchange parities. The presence of exchange risk might be 
1expected to inhibit the development of an international capital market. When 
foreign loans are involved, either the borrower or the lender (or both) run 
an exchange risk. If the borrower's home currency is devalued, the burden 
of a foreign-currency debt will be increased in terms of his own currency. 
(Whether the real burden on the borrower is increased by devaluation depends 
on a host of other factors as well, such as whether devaluation raises the 
profitability of his local investment.) Nevertheless, financial integration 
may proceed rapidly when exchange risk is perceived to be low. The subsequent 
emergence of exchange rate uncertainty will induce many lenders to insure 
1. Canadians floated fixed interest bonds in New York (in U.S. dollars) 
on a large scale during the 1950s, when the Canadian dollar was on a floating 
rate. But expectations (and Canadian monetary policy) kept the Canadian dollar 
close to parity with the U.S. dollar. Moreover, Canadian borrowing in New 
York increased sharply in the 1960s, after Canada switched to a fixed exchange 
rate. How much of the dramatic increase in foreign borrowing was due to factors 
other than the change in exchange rate regime is difficult to say. 
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against parity changes either by borrowing or by selling forward, As the 
volume of outstanding international indebtedness increases, the volume of 
hedging activity in periods of uncertainty will also increase, resulting in 
corresponding pressure on national reserves, These large and sudden movements 
of funds in turn may force reserve-short countries into unnecesaary parity 
changes, or, on the contrary, delay needed changes because of the reduction 
in national wealth (in the form of loss o·f reserves, implied by a change in 
exchange rate when there is a large but temporary short (for devaluation) or 
long (for revaluation) foreign position in the currency. 
4. The Pros and Cons of an International Capital Market 
weTuining now from the analytical and empirical to the normative side, 
may ask whether such financial integration as has taken place is a good ~hing 
or a bad thing. Or to cast the question into policy terms, are the defensive 
reactions by governments desirable or undesirable? These questions cannot not 
be answered sensibly without a point of comparison. What are the alternatives? 
On the standard competitive model, a reduction of artificial barriers to capital 
or by removing policy restrictions,movements, whether by reducing ignorance 
will lead toamore efficient use of the world's scarce resources and hence 
desirable. The economic theorist's presumptionwould generally be regarded as 
in favor of free markets is applicable to capital as well as to goods and 
rates ofservices. Under competitive conditions, capital will seek higher 
return, moving from regions of-relative scarcity. Total output will rise. In 
addition, free movement of funds permits individuals and institutions to 
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diversify their risks, and this too is desirable to the extent that individuals 
deem high risks to be undesirable. Thus there is a diversification as well 
as an efficiency argument for international capital mobility. 
An assessment of the desirability of international capital mobility be­
comes more complicated when competitive conditions are not fulfilled, for 
example because of the presence of import tariffs or income taxes. Inter­
national capital movements may either mitigate or aggravate the efficiency losses 
arising from the tariffs, depending on whether the tariffs raise the return to 
capital more in capital-poor countries than in capital-rich ones. Similarly, 
different national tax rates may either foster or inhibit the efficient alloca- · 
tion of capital among countries. Tax treaties strive for tax neutrality in 
the location of capital. But lower tax rates combined witht2x deferral or 
other tax avoidance devices presumably contribute to better allocation when 
they draw American capital to Belgium than when they draw French or Italian 
capital to Switzerland, perhaps to be relent to the United States. 
Arguments based on ~!locative efficiency assume that economies have ad­
justed fully to prevailing conditions. In particular, they assume that 
balance-of-payments equilibrium is assured, so that real capital movements 
correspond to non-compensatory private and official movements of funds across 
boundaries, and they also assume that the various clm'J'3Stic eco.:1omies respond 
quickly and properly to changes in the pattern and level of demand. Neither 
condition is met in practice. The failure of balance-of-payments adjustment to 
take place promptly and appropriately, in the short- or even medium~run, may 
lead to no more than opposing movements of private and official capital. 
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In this case the increased mobility of capital implies a need for additional 
international liquidity. But it may instead lead to the imposition of restrictions 
on other transactions, introducing resource misallocations or aggravating those 
already present; or it may lead to unwanted unemployment or inflation, the 
former entailing obvious resource costs and the latter involving costs of a 
more subtlf:! sort. Although international capital movements are not ordinarily 
the source of unwanted deflation or inflation, they may inhibit the prompt 
correction of excessive deflationary or inflationary tendencies by constraining 
the use of monetary policy. Fiscal policy can in principle fill the breach 
left by monetary policy for stabilizing the domestic economy, though not without 
occasional help from changes in e,mange rates if balance-of-payments equili­
brium is also to be maintained. But if for political or other reasons fiscal 
policy is not in fact readily available for this role, the costs of international 
capital mobility are correspondingly higher. The United States during the 
period 1960-64 perhaps offers the clearest, and certainly the most costly, 
case in which high capital mobility inhibited the use of monetary policy to 
stimulate a sluggish economy in a period in which fiscal policy could not be 
brought rapidly into play. 
Finally, the increased international mobility of capital will affect the 
distribution of income. Real capital movements will raise the marginal product 
of labor in capital-importing countries and will lower the marginal product 
of labor (relative to what it would otherwise have been, except where the 
foreign investment has come entirely from increased savings) in capital-ex­
porting countries. Under competitive conditions, labor will be made relatively 
better off in the former countries, capital better off in the latter. Even 
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imperfect adjustment of real to financial capital flows will produce these 
effects, although to a lesser degree. In principle, of course, we can 
separate efficiency from equity, allow flows to take place on principles of 
efficiency, and correct for equity through the tax system. In practice, we 
have found great iifficulty in levying incentive-free taxes, so a clear 
separation between the two considerations is not possible. Furthermore, redis­
tributional taxation cannot be laid with impunity on internationally mobile 
factors, for they can escape taxation through migration or through evasion 
permitted by high mobility. Redistributive taxation relies on fragmented 
factor markets to be effective. 
A second distributional effect of high capital mobility arises during the 
transition to a fully integrated capital market. Only the best known (and 
generally largest) firms and banks can borrow in the major international markets,. 
and by shopping around such firms can lower the total cost of their borrowed 
funds -- not least because of the lower international bond rates occasioned 
by tax evasion. Thus the growing international capital market may foster the 
concentration of industry. (A countervailing tendency, at least during the 
trat1Siticnalphaee to full integration, is the invasion of national 
markets by new foreign competitors.) 
How does one weigh these conflicting considerations in assessing the pros 
and cons of an evolution toward an Atlantic capital market? I conclude such 
an evolution is desirable, provided we can coordinate monetary policies 
effectively among countries and obtain more active fiscal policies within 
countries, and provided we can assure that real capital movements correspond 
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closely to net financial flows. An international capital market is no substi­
tute for changes in exchange rate parities, and in fact its presence greatly 
aggravates the currency speculation that can take place in anticipation of 
changes in parities. It thus suggests the need for smaller and more continuous 
- changes in exchange rates, which in turn may reduce somewhat the high mobility 
of capital, If balance-of-payments equilibrium is not assured through 
coordinated monetary policies and provision for more frequent changes in ex­
change rates, however, high capital mobility will exert pressures for trade 
controls and/or unwanted domestic inflation or deflation. Under these circum­
stances high international mobility of capital may well leave us with a third 
or fourth best world, and governemnts may be wise to restrict international 
flows in the interests of attaining at least a second best one. 
